In most developed countries drugs are dispensed to patients through physicians and pharmacists. This paper studies the effects of allowing doctors to directly dispense drugs to patients (self-dispensation) on pharmaceutical coverage. We use a Swiss dataset in our empirical analysis because Switzerland's federalist legislation allows us to study self-dispensing and non-self-dispensing regimes alike. We add location information obtained from Google Geocoding services to our dataset in order to measure coverage based on distances. To capture a driver of long term positioning decisions, we take revenues as a proxy for a pharmacy's usage rate.
Introduction
In most advanced economies patients get their medicines either directly from their doctors (self-dispensation) or via a pharmacy. The discussion about the superiority of either system has long been a political debate that is particularly lifely in countries that employ both systems in parallel. The general idea of splitting prescription and sale of drugs is to prevent over-prescription or prescription of expensive drugs instead of equally effective cheaper medication (e.g. generics). However, while the separation of prescription and sale of drugs is suitable in most regions, factors such as geography or population density can justify self-dispensation. Even though self-dispensation has been shown to potentially increase general drug expenditures (Kaiser and Schmid, 2015) , the aim to ensure optimal medical and pharmaceutical coverage can weigh higher than the additional costs. Though it may help particular regions to allow for self-dispensing physicians, it is obvious that a single person who pools complex competences is a second-best solution to two distinct specialists: a pharmacist with her background in chemistry and pharmacy and a doctor with her background in medicine. Thus it should be in the interest of policy makers to choose the most appropriate system given the cost and coverage situation.
However, company level economic considerations may influence coverage as well as they have the potential to systematically drive pharmacies into highly populated areas. In turn self-dispensation can drive pharmacies away from poorly covered regions that are at the brink of being attractive to them. Also, additional revenue coming from self-dispensation can be attractive to physiscians in rural areas. Consequently, the public discourse among the two main stakeholders, namely pharmacists and physicians, is driven by political lobbying and specific interests and often beclouds the true consequences of self-dispensation rules. Hence this paper intends to study whether the effects of self-dispensation on pharmacies are substiantial to a degree that influences optimal pharmaceutical coverage.
1
In our empirical analysis we make use of a pharmacy level dataset from Switzerland. Switzerland provides an ideal framework for our analysis: Swiss counties (cantons) are free in principle to choose their legislation with respect to selfdispensation and actually make use of both concepts. Hence we have heterogenous regimes within a comparatively small area. We set up a unique dataset based on multiple waves of a cross-sectional business dataset. We enrich this dataset with geospatial information which enables us to pinpoint pharmacies within Switzerland. Further we add municipality level information to the dataset to account for a pharmacy's economic environment. In our analysis of revenues we use propensity score matching (Rosenbaum, 2010) to compare similar pharmacies' revenues under different self-dispensation regimes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second chapter we continue to dicuss the legal situation in Switzerland and provide an overview of the literature on self-dispensation. The third chapter introduces our dataset.
The fourth chapter covers our methodological approach including assessment of coverage and matching. We continue to present our estimation results and finally conclude and summarize our findings. An Appendix provides further estimation diagnostics and robustness checks.
Literature
The following chapter consists of two subparts: The first part gives a general overview of different forms of drug dispensation in the literature. The second part focuses on self-dispensation and elaborates on the specific legal situation in Switzerland.
2

General Overview
The terms and conditions of drug dispensation have historically been subject to a heated debate between two professions with an academic background. Trap (1997) dates this dispute between pharmacists and doctors back to France in the 13th century. A bit earlier the German emperor Fredrick II had initiated the separation of the two professions and hence created a basis for the current system in most European countries.
Recently, several scholars studied the effects of self-dispensing physicians with particular focus on the effect of different regimes on health expenditures. In most developed countries, doctors are not allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients (Filippini, Heimsch, and Masiero, 2013) . Several studies focus on Switzerland as the particular structure of the Swiss health legislation allows to study the effects of a self-dispensation regime next to the effects of a regime that prohibits selfdispensation. A recent study by Kaiser and Schmid (2015) finds that physicians in Switzerland produce higher drug expenditures than pharmacists in the order of 30% per patient. Beck, Kunze, and Oggier (2004) find higher drug expenditures in Swiss cantons that allow self-dispensation, correcting for socio-economic variables. Rischatsch and Trottmann (2009) show that self-dispensing doctors in Switzerland have a higher probability of prescribing the drug with the (most likely)
higher margin compared to non-dispensing doctors. Busato, Matter, Künzi, and Goodman (2010) examine if treatment costs across medical discipline and group of drug dispensation differ for the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Depending on the professional discipline, they find significant arguments both for and against lower costs for boths regimes 1 . For the most expensive treatment (non-invasive specialists) they find significant lower costs for the prescription only case. Reich, Weins, Schusterschitz, and Thöni (2012) show that an increase in the dispensing doctors' density leads to an increase in per capita health care expenditure.
In a recent study commissioned by the Swiss Federal Office of Health Trottmann, Früh, Reich, and Telser (2015) examine if patients in cantons that allow selfdispensation have the same level of drug expenditures as in cantons without selfdispensation. They find, ceteris paribus, lower drug expenditures for the selfdispensation rule and a higher likelihood that patients get generics prescriptions, comparing two similar cantons, and correcting for socio-economic variables. At the same time, self-dispensation leads to higher expenditures for medical services (consultations). Overall, Trottmann, Früh, Reich, and Telser (2015) do not find differences in the level of consuming services from the compulsory health insurance in self-dispenation areas.
Internationally, most studies find self-dispensation to increase health care expenditures. Iizuka (2007) shows for Japan that the possible markup due to their right to self-dispense affects doctors in their prescription choices. Consequently they tend to over-prescribe, and, as a second effect might not choose the optimal medicine from a patient's perspective. Based on the reduction of drug expenditures in Taiwan after self-dispensation was banned Chou, Yip, Lee, Huang, Sun, and Chang (2003) claim that self-dispensation increases expenditures for medicine on a per visit basis. In a systematic review Emery, Lima, Lewis, and Sunderland (2009) examine 21 papers on the comparisons of self-dispensing doctors' and non-dispensing doctors' practices. The examined studies cover countries such as USA (6 papers) and the UK (5), followed by Zimbabwe (5), South Korea (2), Australia (1), South Africa (1), and Taiwan (1). Emery, Lima, Lewis, and Sunderland (2009) conclude that self-dispensing physicians tend to prescribe more pharmaceutical items, produce higher pharmaceutical costs, and are less likely to prescribe generics than non-dispensing doctors. Other studies focus on the aspect of federalism in health care politics (e.g. Greer and Jacobson (2010) or Uhlmann (2013) ). 
State of Legislation of in Switzerland
Switzerland is a federalist country which is structured in 26 cantons and has a long tradition of organizing many aspects of legislation on the federal level. This is also the case for the legal parameters of drug dispensation 2 . Hence different regimes can be found in Switzerland. Figure 1 shows 
Data
The dataset used in this paper has been set up with information from multiple categories, we favor the four groups mentioned above because adding municipality typologies to the dataset with the help of ZIP codes contained in pharmacies' addresses works reasonably on this level of granularity. We also match median income on municipality level to the dataset in order to control for the economic environment of a pharmacy. Table 1 shows and describes all variables contained in the final dataset.
Our sample contains all pharmacies that are subject to explicit legislation and took part in the RoKA study on regular basis. All pharmacies that are member of the pharmaSuisse association are obliged by contract to take part in the study. The fact that the RoKA study is actually conducted by an independent non-pharmaceutical organization makes the RoKA dataset a valuable basis for a scientific contribution to the ongoing public debate about self-dispensation. Currently about 77 percent of all Swiss pharmacies (1744) About 1'000 pharmacies have been taking part in the study on yearly basis. In our Figure 2: Pharmacies across Switzerland see not only immediately that the major part of the pharmacies is under a regime that prohibits self-dispensation, but also that the distance between pharmacies has a much larger variance (28.49 vs. 16.83) in regions where self-dispensation is allowed. On average distances tend to be larger in self-dispensing regions (6.56) than in regions that do not allow self-dispensation (2.76).
The second focal variable in our research is the five year revenue average. Because the legal status of a canton is in fact time invariant in our timespan we do not consider forming a panel dataset here. Consequently pharmacies' mean revenues are averaged over five years. This aggregation of revenues over time also comes in handy inasmuch as cyclical movement is cancelled out. Figure 4 shows the density of revenues by regime.
At about 2.8 million and 2.91 million CHF respectively the sample mean does not differ significantly between both regimes 8 . Visually we can also see that 
Empirical Strategy
Studying the effects of self-dispensing physicians on adequate pharmaceutical coverage makes us investigate two major aspects: First we use distances to measure pharmaceutical coverage itself. Second to get an idea of a pharmacy's usage rate we take pharmacies' revenues as an indicator for a pharmacy's business activity.
Consequently we regard usage of a pharmacy as an important channel through which a canton's pharmaceutical coverage is influenced 10 .
Measuring Coverage
We measure coverage in a particular region by computing the distance of a pharmacy to all other pharmacies in that region. The distance itself is computed from the geo locations of all pharmacies 11 . With the respective longitude and latitude of two points distances can be computed using the Great Circle Distance. Simple trigonometric procedures that assume the earth to be spherical can already produce reasonable results. Considering an equatorial axis and a flat-9 The two sample KS-Test rejects the H0 at the 10 percent level just narrowly (p.value: 0.1097735).
10 Note that we also prefer revenue over profit as an indicator because we suspect smaller measurement error due to the fact that revenue is directly reported from the RoKA online survey. As opposed to profit that would have to be computed from different variables and thus would add up measurement errors of all variables used in the computation.
11 See also section 3.
tening factor computation of distances get more complex but can account for an ellipsoid earth model. The pioneering approach of Vincenty (1975) 
Following Meeus (1999) we can compute the distances d i,j . We use these distances to measure a region's pharmaceutical coverage as follows. Suppose,
where the j-th column is a vector of distances from the j-th pharmacy to all pharmacies in the sample. Hence, the diagonal elements of the matrix D are obviously zero as they contain the distance from a pharmacy to itself. In order to construct a metric for coverage we use the distance matrix D to aggregate the distance of the c closest pharmacies to the j-th pharmacy. Suppose that d j is a sorted sequence of the values of the j-th column of D:
Then, we can easily compute the average distance to the c closest pharmacies to obtain a pharmacy level coverage metric C j . Note that k = 1, is left out as the first element of d j is always zero:
We can further generalize our coverage indicator by:
Typically we use the median or the mean as a function to aggregate the truncated vector of distances. For example if c = 5 was set, we would obtain the average respectively the median distance of the j-th pharmacy to the five closest competitors 13 .
In a second step we continue to investigate what drives pharmacy level coverage on the regional level. We estimate the following simple model to get an idea of the most important driving forces:
l j is a logical variable that indicates whether self-dispensation is allowed in a particular canton. X contains a set of control variables including the size of a pharmacy in square meters, a dummy variable that indicates whether a pharmacy is part of a chain. We also account for a pharmacy's revenue, median income in 13 Appendix 6 covers robustness checks for variations of c.
the municipality and the type of municipality (city centers, agglomerations, rural etc.).
Matching Pharmacies under Different Regimes
Still finding an effect of legislation on coverage as described above raises the question of causality. As discussed before, self-dispensation is meant to moderate insufficient pharmaceutical coverage -particularly in rural regions. Though improving coverage in these regions is clearly desired, self-dispensation potentially affects pharmacies in regions with sufficient coverage, too. Hence we study whether legislation affects pharmacies revenues to a degree that changes pharmacies' behavior in a way that causes undesired effects 14 .
In order to understand coverage better, we study the causal effect of legislation on pharmacies' revenues. Revenue can be seen as a proxy for a pharmacy's usage rate and thus is closely linked to pharmaceutical coverage in the long run. The effect of legislation on revenues can be evaluated in a treatment / control setup. Such setups stem from controlled studies and are widely used in evaluation econometrics and have often been described in the literature. In this chapter we borrow the treatment / control terminology from this strand of literature to conveniently describe our identification strategy. In our case being treated refers to being located in a canton that allows physicians to dispense drugs. In turn being assigned to the control group refers to being under a regime that prohibits self-dispensation. Thus, on the individual level the effect τ of legislation can be regarded as the difference in revenue between both regimes:
In this case undesirable refers to situations that [1] increase health expenditure costs due to over-prescription induced by physicians, [2] that only provide second best coverage for the patient in which optimal coverage (physician and pharmacist) would be possible and [3] situations that lead to over-coverage in populated areas and thinning out in less populated areas.
Y i1 denotes the revenue of pharmacy i under treatment l = SD while Y i0 denotes the revenue of pharmacy i when it is not treated l = N oSD. Because we cannot observe counterfactuals for a single pharmacy we aim at comparing similar pharmacies under different regimes. In randomized studies this comparison is straightforward because treatment and control subjects are interchangeable. In observational studies, however, treatment and control units are hardly balanced in their pre-treatment properties and cannot be interchanged freely.
Thus, in order to identify what is called the Average Treatment Effect on the
Treated (ATT) we follow a well established causal model brought up by Rubin (1974) . Sekhon (2011) describes this model framework and its extensions in greater detail and provides an implementation to compute the ATT τ defined as:
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , the identification of the ATT basically relies on the assumptions that assignment into treatment is unconfounded given a set of covariates and that there is a positive probability of being treated for all observations 15 . In order to account for the distribution of multi-dimensional pre-treatment properties we use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach. As opposed to a straight forward exact matching on pharmacies' properties, PSM represents similarity between pharmacies by a single individual level probability of being treated (propensity score). Thus PSM avoids an issue known as curse of dimensionality when trying to classify finite samples into a large number of different bins.
While the propensity score would be known in a randomized study it is estimated most of the time in practice. The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of being treated given a set of covariates Z. In our case the probability of being located in a canton that allows physicians to dispense drugs is formally defined as
Λ is the cumulative distribution function of a logit and γ is a vector of coefficients.
Hence we can use a standard probit model to estimate the conditional probability that a particular pharmacy is under a self-dispensation regime given Z 16 . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that treated and untreated observations with the same propensity score have the same distributions for all covariates Z.
Z contains information on pharmacies pre-treatment properties such as size of the pharmacy in square meters, the ratio of sales area to a pharamcy's total area, whether a pharmacy belongs to a chain, its legal form, the ownership status and the type of municipality a pharmacy is located in. We chose a caliper of .2 standard deviations and allow for ties and replacement in our basic matching setup 17 .
Estimation Results
This section presents the results of the estimations described in the previous section. First we show how legislation affects the actual coverage measured by the mean distance of a pharmacy to its five closest competitors. Besides we illustrate our findings using graphical heatmaps for examplary regions. In addition to studying coverage itself, we give a closer insight to pharmacies' revenues under self-dispensation as revenue can be seen as a proxy for a pharmacy's usage rate and thus is a channel that influences long run coverage in a particular region. We present the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for pharmacies' revenues located in a canton that allows physicians to dispense drugs. Our main variable of interest, namely legislation has a significant and comparatively strong effect. The average proximity of the five closest pharmacies is 4.04 kilometers larger in cantons that allow self-dispensation. The size of the effect suggests that comparisons of both regimes outside city centers strongly contribute to this result.
Coverage
As stated before we use revenue to proxy a pharmacy's usage rate. Table 2 shows that revenue and coverage do not have a linear relationship. In general, for every 1 million CHF in own revenue, pharmacies tend to be located about 0.67 kilometers further away from the group of competitors in closest proximity. This effect reverses for the most active pharmacies, but decreases in effect size. This is perfectly reasonable because in general newcomers would not move too close to 18 Regression outputs were created using the texreg R packages (Leifeld, 2013) .
a well established competitor -except for regions with extremely high customer frequency. Still though the largest pharmacies are usually located within city centers that naturally contain more pharmacies because of their high population density. Pharmacies must also be regarded as retailers and hence the most active pharmacies are situated in prime locations within city centers.
When controlling for revenue, the actual size of the pharmacy measured in square meters does not have a significant effect on coverage. Being part of a chain reduces the distance to the closest competitors as chains tend to move to city centers and pursue market shares more systematically and aggressively. The chain indicator is not significant though when controlling for revenues as chains tend to have higher revenues on average.
Regional typology plays an important role in our analysis of coverage. As described in section 3 we group municipalities into four types. In our regression we use city centers as the reference type. While we cannot observe a significant difference for urban agglomerations the effects for the remaining types are substantial and significant. The average proximity to the five closest competitors is 7.05 kilometers larger in tertiary regions and more than 5.62 kilometers larger in rural regions than in city centers. Obviously this does not come as a suprise but shows the importance of controlling for this typology in order to study the effects of self-dispensation.
Finally, the wealth of a municipality does have a negative effect on the distance between pharmacies, indicating that the density of pharmacies in Switzerland is higher in wealthier regions. Per 1000 CHF in median taxable income the average proximity of the five closest competitors decreases by 80 meters.
In addition to estimations we studied coverage visually. Heatmaps as examplary Though pairwise visual comparisons do give interesting additional insights it is difficult to find a comprehensive set of pairs. Switzerland is a heterogenous country in many aspects. Its four official languages, the cultural influence from Italy, France and Germany as well its undeniably unique own culture along with a topographically diverse landscape make it difficult to draw exact matches across all dimensions.
Usage (Revenue)
As described in section 4.2 we study the effects of legislation on pharmacies revenues in addition to coverage in order to understand usage of existing pharmacies.
Because of the multi-faceted diversity described in the previous section we use propensity score matching to conveniently condition pharmacies revenues on a set of various pre-treatment properties.
ATT non-drugs) to total revenue. The higher the ratio, the more non-drug products are sold relatively. Again the treatment effect of legislation is substantial and significant: The ratio is about 0.08 higher for pharmacies under a self-dispensation regime. This substantial increase in the relative amount of non-drugs sold can be interpreted as a hint that pharmacies seem to employ side-stepping strategies or to favor a drugstore business approach under a self-dispensation regime.
Conclusion
In this paper we contribute to the debate about drug dispensation which is particularly lively in countries that allow both, physicians and pharmacists, to dispense drugs. We study the effects of self-dispensation on pharmacies based on data from Switzerland. Switzerland can be considered an ideal model case as its legislation is organized on cantonal (county) level and hence provides the opportunity to study different regimes in a relatively small area. The starting point for our research is the idea that optimal coverage from a patient's perspective means that both, pharmaceutical and medical expertise are available in close proximity. Hence legislation that influences coverage of pharmacies or doctors potentially leads to a sub-optimal coverage situation in which both expertises are combined in one person as opposed to two distinct experts in their respective fields.
We find that, ceteris paribus, the density of pharmacies is substantially lower in cantons that allow physicians to dispense drugs. Though improving general medical and pharmaceutical coverage in scarcely populated areas has been the initial impetus of the legislation, we find influences of self-dispensation on pharmacies in other, more populated regions of the same canton, too. Total revenues are substantially lower for pharmacies under a self-dispensation regime compared to similar pharmacies in cantons that prohibit drug dispensation by physicians. In line with these observations we also find that the share of revenues made with nondrugs is substantially higher in cantons that allow self-dispensation. This indicates a side-stepping strategy respectively a shift towards a more drug store oriented business. In the sense of Kaiser and Schmid (2015) and other studies described in section 2 a general replacement of pharmacies through physicians would lead to higher health expenditures due to physicians' incentive to over-prescribe. For the specific case of Switzerland our findings gain further relevance for future debates as pharmacies have just gained new rights lately: To moderate low medical coverage, pharmacies will be allowed to offer additional services such as vaccination that have formerly belonged to the domain of physicians solely.
However, when debating both dispensing regimes policy makers should not only consider potential additional health expenditures but also weigh in the importance of a two way coverage from a patient's perspective as well as the implications to the pharmaceutical and medical professions. It is safe to say that allowing physicians to dispense drugs in regions which are so scarcely populated that pharmacies as retail businesses cannot survive helps to improve pharmaceutical coverage and thus can be considered a Pareto improvement. On the other hand we consider legislation on cantonal level as too coarse -even though cantons are relatively small counties in international comparison. The benefits of self-dispensation are dependent on regional typologies rather than counties. We conclude that the right to dispense drugs should be organized more specifically according to type of a municipality. 
Appendix B: Robustness
The following appendix section discusses the robustness of our ATT estimation results to several ceteris paribus specification changes: number of matches, omission of the proximity variable, using different numbers of pharmacies to compute average proximity. While the ATT estimations are basically robust to the modifications above, the results are sensitive to not accounting for municipality income. This is expected as leaving municipality income out of the propensity score estimation would lead to many matches between the pharmacies in the cantons of Zurich and Ticino. The substantial differences in wealth and structure between these two regions are likely to have a larger effect on pharmacies than the contrary effect of legislation. Table 5 shows the ATT estimation results for the basic setup for different number of matches. 
Appendix C: Matching Diagnostics
This subsection of the appendix discusses metrics to empirically assess the suitability of the propensity matching applied in this paper. Figure 6 shows the density of see that the bulk of the propensity scores belonging to the control group is relatively low and has smaller standard deviation, while the propensity score for the treated observations is lower and has a much larger variance. Figure 6 also shows that there is considerable overlap between both distribution which is an important assumption for propensity score matching.
The matching R package (Sekhon, 2011) provides a convenient way to test the means and distributios of all covariates before and after matching. We perform such a test in order to assess the effectivity of our matching approach in practice.
The following output shows detailed variable by variable comparisons: Table 8 shows means of both treatment and control group before matching. 
